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Abstract. In this paper we study the MOR cryptosystem. We use the
group of unitriangular matrices over a finite field as the non-abelian
group in the MOR cryptosystem. We show that a cryptosystem similar
to the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields can be built using the
proposed groups and a set of automorphisms of these groups. We also
show that the security of this proposed MOR cryptosystem is equivalent
to the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields.
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1 Introduction
Most of the public key cryptosystems popular today are built on abelian
groups. It is natural to try to generalize these cryptosystems to non-
abelian groups, not only because the current systems are getting old with
time, but also there is an interesting academic adventure in trying to do
so. The cryptosystem that we have in mind is the El-Gamal cryptosystem
[3, Section 2] which is built on the Discrete Logarithm Problem [3, Section
2]. The discrete logarithm problem can be generalized in different ways,
to mention just two of them – one was done in [7] and the other is the
MOR cryptosystem [12].
The MOR cryptosystem has attracted a lot of attention and some
well written papers [4,11,14]. In this article we propose a new group and
a subgroup of the group of automorphisms for the MOR cryptosystem.
Our group is the group of unitriangular matrices over a finite field and the
automorphisms are the composition of diagonal, inner and central auto-
morphisms. We show that for this group and subgroup of automorphisms,
MOR is as secure as the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields.
There is still a lot of interest in cryptosystems using the discrete log-
arithm problem in finite fields, for example, the El-Gamal cryptosystem.
We claim that we had a reasonable amount of success with these groups
and automorphisms. Though the most desirable consequence of this re-
search would be no sub-exponential attack on the cryptosystem.
There is one other shift in our proposed MOR cryptosystem. We are
using polycyclic groups [13, Chapter 9] for the cryptosystem; computation
with this class of groups is done differently than with the multiplicative
group of finite fields. We are yet to understand the consequence of this
shift, from arithmetic in finite fields to arithmetic in a polycyclic group
and the use of automorphisms instead of exponentiation.
It is often expected of the proposer of a new cryptosystem to provide
parameters and to show that the cryptosystem is semantically secure1.
The El-Gamal encryption scheme is considered semantically secure [1] and
so it remains to be seen if the proposed MOR cryptosystem is also seman-
tically secure. Note that the semantic security of the MOR cryptosystem
depends on the group used [14, Section 3].
We are not yet in a position to provide parameters because the dis-
crete logarithm problem in the automorphism group, on which the se-
curity of our cryptosystem depends, is not well studied. Moreover, since
the best known attack on the proposed MOR cryptosystem is the dis-
crete logarithm problem in finite fields, hence one can pick parameters
from any cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm problem, e.g., the
El-Gamal cryptosystem and use it for the proposed MOR cryptosystem.
The MOR cryptosystem is a straightforward generalization of the El-
Gamal cryptosystem, so it is easy to see that MOR is not secure against
indistinguishability-secure from chosen-ciphertext attack [3, Section 2],
however ideas similar to the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [1] should make
it achieve any security goal in any attack model.
2 The MOR cryptosystem
In this section we discuss the MOR cryptosystem [12] and critique some
of the points discussed by the authors. There are two different security
concepts used in [12].
i. The discrete logarithm problem in the group of inner automorphisms.
ii. Membership problem in a finite cyclic group.
Let us describe the MOR cryptosystem in details. Let G = 〈γ1, γ2, . . . , γs〉
be a finite non-abelian group. Let φg be an inner automorphism of G
1 For our definition of semantic security see [1]. Briefly stated, a cryptosystem is
semantically secure if it is secure against a passive eavesdropper.
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defined by φg(x) = g
−1xg for all x ∈ G. Then φmg (x) = g
−mxgm for
all x ∈ G and m a positive integer. We are working in the group of
inner automorphisms with the composition of automorphism as the group
operation. Now suppose Eve wants to set up a public key for herself. Then
she chooses g and publishes φg and φ
m
g . She, however, doesn’t publish
g and gm; instead she publishes {φg(γi)}
s
i=1 and {φ
m
g (γi)}
s
i=1. Then to
send a message (plaintext) a ∈ G, Bob computes φrg and φ
mr
g from the
public information, for a random r ∈ N and then computes φmrg (a). He
then sends Eve
(
φrg, φ
mr
g (a)
)
. As in the El-Gamal cryptosystem Alice,
knowing m, can compute φmrg from φ
r
g and, hence, the inverse φ
−mr
g and
the plaintext a.
What does the security of this protocol depend on? Firstly, if one can
solve the discrete logarithm problem in φg and φ
m
g then the protocol is
broken. On the other hand, since the inner automorphisms are presented
as the action on generators, it might be difficult to find g from the public
information {φg(γi)}
s
i=1. Moreover, φg = φgz for any z ∈ Z(G) the center
of the group G, so even if there is an algorithm to find g, that g might
not be unique. The authors of the MOR cryptosystem uses this fact for
security as follows: suppose one knows the g from φg and then tries to
determine the gm in φgm then by solving the conjugacy problem they will
come up with gmz. Then they will have to solve the membership problem
in the cyclic group 〈g〉 before they can even try to solve the discrete
logarithm problem. Of course this attack on the system does not include
that someone might be able to solve for m from the public informations
{φg(γi)}
s
i=1 and {φgm(γi)}
s
i=1. Moreover, as shown in [4, Theorem 1] there
is an effective way using only black box group operations to get around
this membership problem by switching to the discrete logarithm problem
in G/Z(G).
The idea behind this scheme seems to be novel and the idea of using
the membership problem in public key cryptography might have interest-
ing applications. However, the biggest test for an idea to develop a public
key protocol is the ability to find groups that produce fast encryption,
fast decryption and is secure.
The idea of using automorphisms; where the public information about
these automorphisms is its action on generators puts severe restrictions
on the groups useful in this scheme.
The groups used should have a fast algorithm to express an element as a
word in generators. Unless every group element is presented as words
in generators, e.g., polycyclic groups where fast collection algorithms
are available, this is hard to achieve.
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What concerns us the most is the use of two different cryptographic prim-
itives – the discrete logarithm problem and the membership problem si-
multaneously! It can be argued that two insecure locks do not make one
secure lock; just get two different person to work on them simultaneously
or use a meet in the middle attack. The converse of the idea is that one
secure lock is enough to guard a secret. Stated plainly, the idea of using
the membership problem and the discrete logarithm problem simultane-
ously in a protocol is probably not wise. On top of this, since MOR is a
generalization of the El-Gamal cryptosystem whose security depends on
the discrete logarithm problem, the computational Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem and the decision Diffie-Hellman problem [7, Section 2.3]or [3, Section
2]; this cryptosystem is not ideally suited to exploit the membership prob-
lem. This was echoed in [11]. In the definition of the MOR cryptosystem
in [11] the whole automorphism group was considered instead of the group
of inner automorphisms as in [12], and the requirement that the automor-
phisms be presented as action on generators was dropped. Following that:
in this article we won’t use the membership problem; we will rely on the
discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism group for security.
The basic scheme for a MOR cryptosystem is as follows and is an
adaptation of [11, Section 2]:
Let G be a group and φ : G→ G be an automorphism. In this paper,
if we work with automorphisms of G, we work in the automorphism group
of G, with the group operation being the composition of automorphisms.
2.1 Description of the MOR cryptosystem
Alice’s keys are as follows:
Public Key φ and φm, m ∈ N.
Private Key m.
Encryption
a To send a message a ∈ G Bob computes φr and φmr for a random
r ∈ N.
b The ciphertext is (φr, φmr(a)).
Decryption
a Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (φr, φmr(a)), she com-
putes φmr from φr and then φ−mr and then from φmr(a) computes
a.
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Alice can compute φ−mr two ways; if she has the information necessary
to find out the order of the automorphism φ then she can use the identity
φt−1 = φ−1 whenever φt = 1. Also, she can find out the order of some
subgroup in which φ belongs and use the same identity. However, the
smaller the subgroup, more efficient the decryption algorithm.
3 Proposed group for the MOR cryptosystem
The non-abelian group we are proposing for the MOR cryptosystem is the
group of unitriangular matrices over a finite field Fq of characteristic p,
where p is a prime number. The group of unitriangular matrices over Fq
is often denoted by UT (n, q). This group consists of all square matrices
of dimension n; the diagonal elements are 1 (the multiplicative identity
of the field) and all entries below the diagonal are 0 (the additive identity
of the field). The entries above the diagonal can be any element of the
finite field Fq. The group operation is matrix multiplication. An arbitrary
element g ∈ UT (4, q) looks like,
g =


1 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 1 ∗ ∗
0 0 1 ∗
0 0 0 1

 .
The ∗ denotes a field element. From a simple counting argument it follows
that UT (n, q) is a Sylow p-subgroup of the general linear group GL(n, q)
where p is the characteristic of the finite field Fq.
Let eij for i < j represent the matrix with 1 in the (i, j) position and
0 elsewhere. It is customary to represent g ∈ UT (n, q) as 1 +
∑
i<j
aijeij ,
where aij ∈ Fq. Notice that 1 above is the identity matrix. We will abuse
the notation a little bit and use 1 as the identity of UT (n, q) and Fq si-
multaneously. It should be clear from the context which 1 we are referring
to.
There are two fundamental set of relations in UT (n, q) along with
the relations in the field Fq. For (1 + aeij), (1 + bekj) ∈ UT (n, q) where
a, b ∈ Fq they are as follows:
(1 + aeij)(1 + beij) = 1 + (a+ b)eij (1)
[1 + aeij , 1 + bekl] =


1 + abeil if j = k, i 6= l
1− abekj if i = l, j 6= k
1 otherwise
(2)
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Here [x, y] = x−1y−1xy is the commutator of elements x, y ∈ G for any
group G. It is well known that the additive group of Fq, often written as
F
+
q , is a γ dimensional vector space over Zp, where p
γ = q. It follows [15,
Page 455] that the minimal set of generators of UT (n, q) are 1+ δkei,i+1,
k = 1, 2, . . . , γ and i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. The set {δ1, δ2, . . . , δγ} is a basis of
F
+
q over Zp. The center of UT (n, q) is 1 + ke1,n where k ∈ Fq.
Since UT (n, q) is a finite p-group, it is a finite nilpotent group and a
polycyclic group [13, Proposition 3.4].
Definition 1 (Polycyclic Group). A group G is a polycyclic group if
there is a finite chain of subgroups G = G1 ⊃ G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Gk ⊃ Gk+1 = 1
such that Gi+1 is a normal subgroup of Gi and Gi/Gi+1 is cyclic.
Since in a polycyclic group G, Gi/Gi+1 is cyclic, there is an ai in Gi
such that the image of ai in Gi/Gi+1 generates Gi/Gi+1. It is easy to see
that {a1, a2, . . . , ak} generates the group G and is known as the polycyclic
generating set. Since we are dealing with finite groups, |Gi+1 : Gi| = mi
is finite. It follows that (see [13, Section 9.4]) every word in G can be ex-
pressed uniquely as aα11 a
α2
2 . . . a
αk
k where 0 ≤ αj < mj for j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
These words are called collected words. Using a collection algorithm [13,
Section 9.4] any word in {a1, . . . , ak} can be expressed as a collected
word. So, in this group computing the inverse and the product is fast and
easy, i.e., there is a fast implementation of polycyclic groups and their
arithmetic [2, Polycyclic Package].
Let us talk about a polycyclic generating set of UT (n, p); for an arbi-
trary finite field Fq this can be similarly done. For sake of simplicity we
take n = 4. Let a1 = 1 + e12, a2 = 1 + e23, a3 = 1 + e34, a4 = 1 + e13,
a5 = 1 + e24 and a6 = 1 + e14. It is shown in [13, Section 9.4, Example
4.1] that {a1, a2, . . . , a6} forms a polycyclic generating set for UT (4,Z).
It is easy to see that this is also a polycyclic generating set for UT (4, p)
for an arbitrary prime p. The polycyclic generating set for UT (n, p) can
be similarly found for an arbitrary n.
3.1 The diagonal automorphism
Let D be an diagonal matrix, i.e., a matrix of dimension n over the field
Fq, and the only non-zero elements are in the diagonals. We will repre-
sent a diagonal matrix D as [w1, w2, w3, . . . , wn], where wi are non-zero
elements of the field K and are the diagonal elements of the matrix D. It
is easy to see that if w1 = w2 = . . . = wn then the diagonal matrix is a
scalar matrix. Weir[15, Section 4] introduced the diagonal automorphisms
on UT (n, q). Let D be a diagonal matrix given by [w1, w2, . . . , wn]; then
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from matrix multiplication it follows that D−1xD for an x ∈ UT (n, q)
where x = 1+
∑
i<j
aijeij is given by 1+
∑
i<j
(w−1i aijwj)eij . Since the scalar
matrices have the same diagonal elements, the group of diagonal auto-
morphisms has order (q − 1)n−1.
These diagonal automorphisms are not inner automorphisms because
the diagonal matrices are not unitriangular. We will now study the MOR
cryptosystem using these diagonal automorphisms. It is easy to see that if
D = [w1, w2, . . . , wn] and φ(x) = D
−1xD for x ∈ UT (n, q) then φm(x) =
D−mxDm whereDm = [wm1 , w
m
2 , . . . , w
m
n ] wherem ∈ N. So, if Alice makes
D and Dm public then finding the m is solving the discrete logarithm
problem in the multiplicative group F×q of the finite field Fq.
If the plaintext is a ∈ UT (n, q), then computing φm(a) is easy and
can be done easily from the formula above. So, using these diagonal auto-
morphisms one can have a secure protocol similar to that of the El-Gamal
cryptosystem. Clearly, there is no advantage for using this protocol over
El-Gamal; the security depends on the discrete logarithm problem in the
multiplicative group of the finite fields; but one has to do more work than
the El-Gamal cryptosystem for encryption and decryption.
If we take the group UT (2, q) of 2 × 2 unitriangular matrix over the
finite field Fq, then for a x ∈ F
×
q we can consider a diagonal automorphism
presented on the generator of this group as
φ :=
(
1 1
0 1
)
7→
(
1 x
0 1
)
and the mth power φm :=
(
1 1
0 1
)
7→
(
1 xm
0 1
)
.
If we use the MOR protocol as in Section 2.1 with these automorphisms,
then it is identical to the El-Gamal cryptosystem over a finite field.
So, we claim that the MOR cryptosystem as in Section 2.1 with the
diagonal automorphisms is computationally and semantically secure and
can be made indistinguishability-secure from chosen-ciphertext attack us-
ing ideas similar to the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem[1]. Notice that it is
essential for the above mentioned use, that the wi are all different from
one another; otherwise valuable information about the plaintext will be
leaked.
3.2 The inner automorphism
Inner automorphisms are the easiest of the automorphisms to study; they
are defined as Ig(x) = g
−1xg for all x ∈ UT (n, q) and g ∈ UT (n, q). It is
well known that the group of inner automorphisms I(G) for an arbitrary
group G is a normal subgroup of the automorphism group of G. It is also
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known that I(G) is isomorphic to G/Z(G). From which it follows that
the order of the group of inner automorphisms of the group UT (n, q) is
q
n2−n−2
2 . We will now see what happens if we use the inner automorphisms
for the MOR cryptosystem.
Let φ = Ig as described in the MOR cryptosystem (see Section 2.1).
Since the conjugacy problem is easy and we are not using the membership
problem, we can safely assume that g and gm is public. If
g =


1 a12 a13 a14
0 1 a23 a24
0 0 1 a34
0 0 0 1


then
gm =


1ma12 ∗ ∗
0 1 ma23 ∗
0 0 1 ma34
0 0 0 1


where ∗ represents a field element.
Now the discrete logarithm problem to find m essentially becomes the
discrete logarithm problem in F+q . Since the discrete logarithm problem
in the additive group of a finite field is known to be easy, we do not
believe that using only inner automorphisms one can build a secure MOR
cryptosystem.
3.3 The central automorphism
The group of central automorphisms is the group most widely studied
after the group of inner automorphisms. The reason of its popularity is
that the group of central automorphisms is the group of centralizers of the
group of inner automorphisms, i.e., the central automorphisms commute
with the inner automorphisms and fix the derived subgroup elementwise.
It can be shown that if ψ is a central automorphism of a group G then
ψ(g) = gzg where zg ∈ Z(G) and depends on g. It follows [5] that a
description of the central automorphism ζr(λ) of UT (n, q) is
ζr(λ) : 1 + ar,r+1er,r+1 7→ 1 + ar,r+1er,r+1 + λ (ar,r+1) e1,n
where λ is an endomorphism of F+q and r = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Now since
λ is an endomorphism and F+q is a γ-dimensional vector space over Zp,
if λ(δi) = bi for i = 1, 2, . . . , γ then we arrive at [15, Page 463] where
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a description of the central automorphisms for the UT (n, q) is given as
1 + δier,r+1 7→ 1 + δier,r+1 + bie1,n where r = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, bi is an
arbitrary element of Fq. This can also be represented as 1+δier,r+1 7→ (1+
δier,r+1)(1+bie1,n). So composing this map n times gives us 1+δier,r+1 7→
(1 + δier,r+1)(1 + nbie1,n). Notice that if r = 1, n − 1 then the central
automorphisms are inner automorphisms and from this it follows that
the order of the group of central automorphisms is qγ(n−3) where pγ = q
(see [15, Page 463]). Since the description of the central automorphisms
depend on λ, unlike the inner or the diagonal automorphisms the only
possible description of a central automorphism is by action on generators
of the group G.
So, if we take a central automorphism to use in the MOR cryptosys-
tem then from the public information the discrete logarithm problem is
the same as the discrete logarithm problem in F+q . The discrete logarithm
problem in the additive group of a finite field is easy; central automor-
phisms alone do not provide us with a secure MOR cryptosystem.
4 A proposed automorphism for the MOR cryptosystem
Currently the proposed group for the MOR cryptosystem [12] is SL(2,Zp)⋊
Zp. This is a split extension of SL(2,Zp) by Zp. The automorphisms pro-
posed are the inner automorphisms. It is shown in [11, Theorem 2] that
the discrete logarithm problem in the group of inner automorphisms of
SL(2,Zp)⋊Zp is the same as the discrete logarithm problem in SL(2,Zp).
In [9] the authors show that the discrete logarithm problem in GL(n, q),
the general linear group over the finite field Fq, is at most as hard as the
discrete logarithm problem in some finite extension field of Fq. Since there
are sub-exponential attacks on the discrete logarithm problem in finite
fields such as the index calculus attack, there is every reason (practical
as well as academic) to look for non-abelian groups and automorphisms
in these groups in search for a better MOR cryptosystem.
In [4] the authors developed a central commutator attack ; they showed
that inner automorphisms are not well suited for MOR cryptosystem;
especially when the group is nilpotent.
So, it is now clear that if we are using nilpotent groups, (UT (n, q)
is a finite p-group and hence nilpotent) then we have to look for outer
automorphisms. The diagonal and the central automorphisms are outer
automorphisms. On the other hand, as we saw in the last section, diago-
nal automorphisms do provide us with a secure MOR cryptosystem and
the only way to represent a central automorphism is its action on gen-
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erators. The security with diagonal automorphisms turns out to be the
discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of the finite field,
and the central and the inner automorphisms from their presentation
reveals valuable information.
Now we are in a position to describe and justify the automorphism
group that we are going to propose for the MOR cryptosystem, it is
central composed inner composed diagonal automorphism.
Let us denote by I, D and L the group of inner, diagonal and the central
automorphisms of UT (n, q) respectively. It is well known that the cen-
tralizer of a normal subgroup in a group G is normal in G. The subgroup
I is normal in the automorphism group of UT (n, q) and so is L. So, IL is
a subgroup of the automorphism group of UT (n, q). The diagonal auto-
morphisms do not commute with the inner automorphisms, the group of
automorphisms we plan on using are elements of the subgroup (IL)⋊D.
It clearly follows that the subgroup of the above automorphisms have
order
q
n2−n−2
2 × (q − 1)n−1 × qγ(n−3) where pγ = q.
We saw earlier that the discrete logarithm problem in the group of
diagonal automorphisms is at most as secure as the discrete logarithm
problem in the finite field.
We were hoping that by composing a diagonal automorphism with the
inner and central automorphism we might be able to diffuse the public
information, so that, the reduction to the discrete logarithm problem in
the finite field becomes impossible. We now show by means of a small
example that with the best of efforts we are not able to beat the sub-
exponential attack on finite fields.
4.1 A small example
We now explain the MOR cryptosystem with a small example. We used
[2, Polycyclic Package] for this example, notations are from Section 3. We
choose n = 4 and q = 1297 where 1297 is a prime. We pick three random
integers 984, 807 and 452. Then we define a central automorphisms (see
Section 3.3) map1 as
map1 =


a1 −→ a1a
984
6
a2 −→ a2a
807
6
a3 −→ a3a
452
6
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all other generators remain fixed. Note that a central automorphism fixes
commutators. Next we pick a random element h := a831 a
462
2 a
1202
3 a
1209
4 a
793
5 a
152
6
and compute the inner automorphism (see Section 3.2), map2 : x 7→
h−1xh corresponding to h.
map2 :=


a1 −→ a1a
462
4 a
1001
6
a2 −→ a2a
1214
4 a
1202
5 a
103
6
a3 −→ a3a
835
5 a
88
6
a4 −→ a4a
1202
6
a5 −→ a5a
1214
6
a6 −→ a6
Then we take the diagonal automorphism (see Section 3.1) corresponding
to [624, 155, 538, 126], the diagonal automorphism map3 is
map3 =


a1 −→ a
576
1
a2 −→ a
1267
2
a3 −→ a
574
3
a4 −→ a
878
4
a5 −→ a
938
5
a6 −→ a
736
6
Then the automorphism Alice will make public is φ = map1 ·map2 ·map3
and that is given by
φ =


a1 −→ a
576
1 a
972
4 a
538
6
a2 −→ a
1267
2 a
1055
4 a
383
5 a
508
6
a3 −→ a
574
3 a
1139
5 a
558
6
a4 −→ a
878
4 a
118
6
a5 −→ a
938
5 a
1168
6
a6 −→ a
736
6
and if Alice chooses her private key to be 65 then
φ65 =


a1 −→ a
450
1 a
1145
4 a
618
6
a2 −→ a
1263
2 a
1269
4 a
1242
5 a
1093
6
a3 −→ a
526
3 a
708
5 a
279
6
a4 −→ a
264
4 a
1190
6
a5 −→ a
274
5 a
836
6
a6 −→ a
85
6
The automorphisms φ and φ65 are public, (see description of the MOR
cryptosystem in Section 2.1). Notice that (576)65 mod 1297 = 450. An
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observant reader will further notice that from the public information of φ
and φ65 that if k′j is the exponent of aj in φ
65(aj) and if kj is the exponent
of aj in φ(aj) for j = 1, 2, 3 and j = 6, then k
′
j is k
65
j . The reason for
this is that the inner and the central automorphisms leave the exponent
of a1, a2, a3, a6 unchanged in the image as seen in map1 and map2. The
only thing that changes {a1, a2, a3, a6} is the diagonal automorphism and
then the change is aj 7→ a
w−1j wj+1
j for j = 1, 2, 3 and a6 7→ a
w−1
1
w4
6 . Then
composing the map m times gives us aj 7→ a
(w−1j wj+1)
m
j for j = 1, 2, 3 and
a6 7→ a
(w−11 w4)
m
6 .
This leads us to the best known attack against this cryptosystem. If
one can solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field then he can
figure out them from the public information of φ and φm as demonstrated
above. There are sub-exponential algorithms, such as the index calculus
methods, in finite fields to solve the discrete logarithm problem.
5 The security of the proposed MOR cryptosystem
If we assume that MOR using UT (n, q) with proposed automorphisms
is broken for an arbitrary n, then it is broken in UT (2, q) with diagonal
automorphisms. The MOR cryptosystem using UT (2, q) is similar to the
El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields (see Section 3.1). This breaks
the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields. Conversely, if the El-Gamal
cryptosystem over finite fields is broken by solving DLP in finite fields
then one can break the proposed MOR cryptosystem. This is clear from
the action of the automorphisms on the elements as described before
and is also clear from the example above. So, we claim that in terms of
security, the proposed MOR cryptosystem is equivalent to the El-Gamal
cryptosystem over finite fields.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied a new non-abelian finite group and a group
of outer automorphisms for the MOR cryptosystem. The computational
security of any proposed cryptosystem is always an open question. This is
the first time that the group of unitriangular matrices and automorphisms
over it has been proposed for public key cryptography; more work needs
to be done to assure one of the security of the said system.
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This article clearly shows that the MOR cryptosystem has a lot to
offer to the public key cryptography. We showed that with the right kind
of groups, the MOR cryptosystem can offer a secure cryptosystem.
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